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In this paper we are interested in the organization of long-term care within a given population.
Three care ﬁnancers are identiﬁed: the family, the government and the care receiver who
can buy a dependency insurance. Our interest lies in the eﬀect of governmental intervention
on the demand/supply of these three forms of LTC i.e. how state intervention aﬀects the
provision of LTC by the market and the family. Knowing that, we search for an eﬃcient
organization of LTC.
For that, we consider a heterogeneous society composed of diﬀerent pairs of parent/child.
Each parent has a probability of becoming dependent and he/she must receive appropriate
cares if this happens. Children are active on the labor market. Additionally, they may
devote part of their income to help their dependent parents. The population is heteroge-
neous. Parents diﬀer according to their income level; children are altruistic or not. These
characteristics cannot be observed by the government.
Information asymmetry is a serious constraint on what can actually be implemented by
the government. We show that rich parents may not always subscribe to a LTC insurance,
even if it is socially optimal that they do so. This non-purchase of insurance is due to the
high opportunity cost of insurances, even if they are supplied on the market at an actuary
fair price i.e. insurance is crowded-out by other forms of LTC.
As a consequence, the government will reduce the opportunity cost of insurances by
decreasing its support to other forms of LTC provided directly by the state or by the family.
Alternatively, the government can reduce the share of market ﬁnanced LTC within the
economy.
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In OECD countries, the share of people over 65 and over 80 is increasing and demographic trends
show that these proportions will continue to increase in the future. This demographic process
is accompanied by an increase in the demand for long-term care (LTC) by elderly dependent at
the end of their life.1 A major challenge for an ageing of the society is therefore to ﬁnance the
provision of appropriate long-term care to dependent people.
Facing the problem of an ageing population and the associated increase in demand for LTC,
countries have chosen diﬀerent institutional solutions to tackle this problem (see Karlson et al.,
2004 for a detailed comparison between Germany, Japan, Sweden, United States and UK and
OECD, 2005). In Germany, the government introduced in 1995 a mandatory long-term care
insurance program that covers most of the population. The system is ﬁnanced by a new tax on
wages equals to 1.7% of the salary. The LTC insurance is a PAYG system and it is managed
as a part of the social security system. An elderly dependent can apply for LTC beneﬁts;
his/her dependency level determines the level of help he/she receives. Beneﬁts are of three
kinds: professional care at home, institutional care and cash. The right to these forms of help
is independent of the income level. Introducing cash payment is meant to support the provision
of informal care by relatives. By doing so, informal helpers can receive a compensation for their
LTC provision. The German mandatory insurance is an exception and most of the countries
do not have universal LTC coverage. In many countries, an elderly dependent person does not
necessarily receive help from the state. In the UK for example, the local authorities provide care
in residential homes and public intervention in LTC ﬁnancing is targeted to low income people.
Service provision and ﬁnancial intervention by local authorities are subject to means-testing and
higher income individuals must self-ﬁnance their LTC needs with their own resources or must
rely on informal help from their relatives.
Organizing LTC ﬁnancing is a complex issue since many care providers and care ﬁnancers are
involved. Three diﬀerent categories of long-term care can be distinguished: nursing home care,
residential care provided informally by the relatives and paid residential care. Informal care is
by large the most important source of LTC. For Sweden, Johansson (2000) estimated that two-
thirds of the total volume of LTC is provided informally by relatives and friends. Bonsang (2007)
documents on the basis of the SHARE-1 survey2 that 30.9% of adult children aged between 50
1Long term cares refer to the provision of help/care to a dependent person for his/her activities of daily living
(ADL). LTC excludes medical cares that are usually ﬁnanced by other means.
2The SHARE survey (wave 1) has been carried out in 2004 in 10 European Countries. It contains detailed
information on a sample of individuals aged over 50.
1and 69, with at least one living parent (not necessarily dependent) and not living with them,
provide help in time to their parents, with an average of 25.1 hours per month. Help consists in
personal care for 27.5% of the helping children. Direct ﬁnancial help is much less common since
it concerns only 2.6% of the children.
The share of private spending remains important in LTC ﬁnancing. The OECD estimated
that LTC spending accounts for 1.35% of GDP in Germany and for 1.37% in the UK. In both
countries, the private spending represents 30% of the total expenses. Nursing home care is by
large the most expensive form of LTC and it captures the largest fraction of LTC spending (more
than 60% of the total public spending in most of the OECD countries). Because nursing home
cares are costly for both the state and the individual and because elderly dependents prefer to
stay at home (whenever it is possible), policies are settled to support informal care and paid
residential care. These initiatives include in-kind beneﬁt, budget for LTC care and ﬁnancial
support for informal helpers.
Private insurances could constitute an interesting alternative to public and private ﬁnancing
of LTC. But the market for dependency insurance is not very well developed. Several reasons may
explain that. Pauly (1990) and Brown and Finkelstein (2007) show that there is an important
crowding out of private insurances by the public ﬁnancing of LTC, Medicaid in the US. Pestieau
and Sato (2007) show that parents may prefer cares from their family to a private insurance,
especially those who have a low income and those who anticipate an important help from their
children. In light of that, a major problem for the organization of LTC by the state is that state
intervention may seriously crowd-out LTC provided by the market and/or the family. This might
be a serious concern for a ﬁnancially constrained government facing an ageing population.
In this paper we are interested in the ﬁnancing of LTC within a given population. Three
sources of care ﬁnancing are identiﬁed: family support provided by the relatives (the child in our
model), private ﬁnanced cares by the individuals either directly or through a private insurance3
and government ﬁnanced cares. Government intervention is either direct: The government
provides nursing home care places or indirect: The government supports LTC provision by the
family. Our interest lies in the eﬀect of governmental intervention on the demand/supply of
these three forms of LTC i.e. how state intervention aﬀects the provision of LTC by the market
and the family. Knowing that, we search for an eﬃcient organization of LTC.
For that, we consider a society composed of diﬀerent pairs of parent/child. Each parent has
3Parents always prefer to buy a private insurance to insuring themselves through saving (at least for reasonable
loading factor charged by the insurance company). Brown and Finkelstein (2007) document a load factor of 18%
for LTC insurance.
2a probability of becoming dependent and he/she must receive appropriate cares if this happens.
Children are active on the labor market. Additionally, they may devote part of their income
to help their dependent parents. The population is heterogeneous. Parents diﬀer according to
their income level. For simplicity, we consider two income levels i.e. we distinguish “rich”and
“poor”parents. A child may or may not be concerned about the long-term care received by
his/her dependent parent. That is, we distinguish altruistic and non-altruistic children. In
our model, the government cannot observe the type of the parents (rich or poor) and of the
children (altruistic or not). Information asymmetry is a serious constraint on what can actually
be implemented by the government.
Parents have the option to buy a private insurance that ﬁnance LTC in case of dependency.
A parent decides on the amount of insurance he/she subscribes. We consider that the insurance
market is competitive, meaning that LTC insurances are oﬀered for an actuary fair premium. If
the insurance market is not competitive, the problems we enlighten in this paper are exacerbated.
Non-insured parents receive cares from their children if they agree to do so i.e. if the child
is altruistic and if he/she prefers to help his/her parent to other forms of LTC. Non-insured
parents of non-altruistic children have no other option than going to a public nursing home. We
assume that these three forms of care are mutually exclusive. This means for example that an
altruistic child does not help his/her parent if he/she is insured.
In this context, we search for the optimal policy mix, taking into account the reaction of
private actors. Of course, the best policy depends on the instruments and the information
available to the social planner. Consider that the LTC insurance is fair. If redistribution of
the society’s resources can be done at no cost through lump-sum taxes and subsidies, the best
policy consists in delegating the LTC ﬁnancing to the market. All parents are insured (at a fair
price) and the government cancels out ex-ante diﬀerences in wealth with appropriate income
redistribution.
If the government cannot distribute all the resources, the market solution may no longer be
the most eﬃcient one. A possible limit in the government’s ability to redistribute resources is its
inability to tax the wealth of the parents.4 As a matter of fact, parent’s wealth consists of assets
that may not, for whatever reasons, be taxed. Moreover, the government may not have the
ability to observe the wealth of the parents. This seriously limits the possibility of ﬁnancing the
insurance of the poor parents with a redistributive policy. And, ﬁnancing a universal insurance
with labor income taxes might be prohibitively costly mainly because rich parents will also be
subsidized.
4Another is distortionary taxation.
3The government then adopts another ﬁnancing scheme for LTC mixing market, state and
family ﬁnanced cares. Instead of redistributing income to ﬁnance private insurances, parents
could subscribe to a LTC insurance if they have enough resources and if they agree to do so.
Otherwise they can be helped by their family or directly by the state. For that, the government
oﬀers publicly ﬁnanced nursing homes. Moreover, the government can support family ﬁnanced
cares by supporting altruistic children. Hence, without perfect redistribution, the market, the
family and the state could all contribute to LTC ﬁnancing.
But, information constraint limits what can be actually implemented by the state. The
main problem is that rich parents may prefer to receive cares from their family or from the
state to subscribe a private insurance, even if they would receive more cares in the latter case.
The reason is that, even for a fair premium, the insurance cost might be considerable once
opportunity costs are taken into account. If a parent is insured, he/she renounces to the other
forms of LTC. Hence the LTC he/she might receive in the absence of insurance constitutes the
opportunity cost of the insurance. We can then associate to this opportunity cost an implicit
load factor for the insurance. This load factor might be considerable, discouraging the parents
to subscribe to a private insurance. This rational non-purchase of LTC insurance, even for a fair
premium, has been pointed ﬁrst by Pauly (1990). We observe the same in our model. Because
of the high implicit cost, rich parents may not subscribe to private LTC insurances.
The government cannot constraint the rich parents to be insured because wealth is unob-
servable. Hence, facing rich parents that do not have incentives to be insured, the government
has two options. It can either reduce the share of the market in LTC ﬁnancing and expend the
family and the state ﬁnanced support. The cost being that each dependent parent receives less
for his/her LTC needs because resources must be shared by a larger number of claimants. This
solution is adopted in Germany where dependent parents have an unconditional access to LTC
support ﬁnanced by labor income taxes. Or, it can decrease the opportunity cost of insurances
by reducing its support to LTC ﬁnancing by the state and the family. This must be done in a
way that preserve the incentives for the altruistic children to help their dependent parents. The
means-testing and the mandatory individual participation to LTC ﬁnancing adopted in the UK
are means to reduce the opportunity cost of private insurances for the richer individuals. In
both cases, poor parents suﬀer from the non-purchase of insurance by the rich ones.
This paper is closely linked to Pestiau and Sato (2007) and Jousten et al. (2005). In their
model, Pestiau and Sato (2007) consider a population of heterogeneous parent/child pairs. In
particular, they focus on children with diﬀerent labor productivities. This in turn aﬀects the
amount of help a child may provide to his/her dependent parent. And parents anticipating
4diﬀerent levels of care by their families will have a diﬀerent attitude towards other sources of
LTC, provided by the state and the family. Optimal policies are derived in this context. In the
current paper, we consider other sources of heterogeneity within the population: children diﬀer
with respect to their altruism; parents diﬀer with respect to their initial wealth level. Jousten
et al. (2005) develop a model where the only source of heterogeneity is the childrens altruism.
There is no LTC insurance in this model and it focuses on the impact of the altruism on the
supply of institutional care by the government. If the government does not observe the degree of
altruism, a too generous provision of publicly ﬁnanced nursing home crowds-out informal help.
Welfare consequences on each category of the population are then evaluated. This paper adds
another source of heterogeneity on the parents side of the population.
2 Model
We consider an heterogeneous population of N parent/child pairs. Parents diﬀer according to
their wealth endowment; children diﬀer according to their degree of altruism. The population
is divided into four groups. Groups 1 and 2 contain the rich parents (wealth level IH) and their
respectively non-altruistic and altruistic child. Poor parents are in group 3 (altruistic child) and
4 (non-altruistic child). ni, i = 1,2,3,4 is the proportion of each group in the total population
N that we normalize to 1.
The parents have an initial wealth level I ∈ {IH,IL}, with IL < IH. Independently of
his/her wealth, each parent faces a probability of dependency π. The utility (V ) of a parent
depends on his/her consumption level Cp and the help H he/she receives in case of dependency.
V = v(Cp) + πh(H)
Children are either altruistic or not. Both types of children have a utility level u(Cc) when
they consume Cc. In addition, altruistic children also care about the help H received by his/her
parent in case of dependency (but not on his/her parent consumption if he/she remains in good
health). The degree of altruism is measured by a parameter β ∈ {0,1}. For simplicity, we
will consider that children are either perfectly altruist (β = 1) or non-altruist (β = 0). Perfect
altruism means that there is no divergence of interests between the state and the child on the
level of care that must be oﬀered to his/her parent. The utility levels (U) of altruistic and
non-altruistic children are respectively:
U = u(Cc) + h(H)
U = u(Cc)
5All the children have the same labor income w.
For closed form solutions, we will consider a logarithmic speciﬁcation for the functions v(.),
u(.) and h(.).
The total welfare W is the sum of all utilities excluding the altruistic component of the







i ) + πh(Hi)))
Rich and poor parents are endowed with an initial wealth level of IH and IL; children have a
labor income w. So that, the total resources of the economy are (n1 +n2)IH +(n3 +n4)IL +w.
A benevolent government maximizes the total welfare W. A major problem for the gov-
ernment comes from information asymmetries between the government and the population. In
this paper, we consider that the government cannot observe the individual characteristics of the
population. In particular, we consider that the government does not observe the wealth of the
parents and the altruism of the children.5 This means that the policy cannot be contingent
on the wealth of the parents (they can always pretend that they are poor) nor on the degree
of altruism of the children (they can always pretend to be non-altruist). These information
asymmetries seriously constraint the intervention in LTC ﬁnancing by the government.
3 Provision of long-term care
In case of dependency, the parents can beneﬁt from institutionalized (or public) and/or non
institutionalized (or private) assistance. This assistance consists in either in-house care (food,
nursing assistance,...) or in a nursing home. We distinguish tree source of LTC care ﬁnancing:
the market, the family and the state. Market ﬁnancing of LTC consists of private insurance
subscribed by the parents before dependency occurs. Dependent parents receive a payment
from their insurance company to ﬁnance their LTC needs. Family ﬁnancing consists in ﬁnancial
transfers from children to their parents. Resources received from the family or the insurance
company can be spent in LTC. The state intervenes directly and indirectly in the provision of
LTC. It oﬀers publicly ﬁnanced cares for the persons in need. We will consider that this direct
intervention consists of public nursing homes. In addition, it (may) subsidizes the provision of
LTC by the family. For example, the state may oﬀers ﬁnancial help to the helping children.6 We
5There is potentially a third source of information asymmetry between the government and the population if
the dependency status is not perfectly observable. We left aside this and consider that the parents cannot cheat
on their dependency status. See Kuhn and Nuscheler (2007) for an analysis of this case.
6OECD (2005) lists the solution adopted by a sample of member countries to ﬁnance non-profesionnal LTC.
6do not consider the possibility for the state to subsidy private insurances.7 In the remaining,
we will consider that these three forms of care are mutually exclusive.
3.1 The market: private insurance
A private dependency insurance is available on the market. The insurance taker must decide
on the premium paid and the corresponding payment in case of dependency. If the insurance is
actuary fair, the premium is equal to the expected insurance payment, that is for a premium of
πa, the policy holder receives a payment of a in case he/she is dependent. The insurance is not
actuary fair if for a repayment of a, the premium exceeds πa. We will assume that the market
for LTC insurances is competitive. Hence LTC insurances are oﬀered for a fair premium.
The insurance must be taken before dependency occurs. A parent, endowed with wealth level
I, that decides to buy an insurance chooses the amount of insurance a in order to maximize
his/her expected utility:
max
a v(I − πa) + πh(a)




A parent buys insurance if its expected utility with an amount of insurance a∗ exceeds his/her
expected utility with another type of LTC, provided by either the state or the family. We will
show that renouncing to other forms of LTC is the opportunity cost of the insurance. This
opportunity cost implies that, even at a fair price, there is a positive load factor for the LTC
insurance i.e. the premium exceeds πa once opportunity costs are taken into account.
3.2 The family: informal care provided by altruistic children
Parents of altruistic children may rely on their help if they need LTC. Those who anticipate
family help will not subscribe to an insurance. If dependency occurs, the child will decide on
the amount of help he/she provides to his/her parent. A child endowed with resources y will
devote a part s of his/her available income to help his/her parent.8 For a child with an altruism
parameter β = 1, the optimal amount of help is found by solving:
max
s u(y − s) + h(s)
7Pestieau and Sato (2007) introduce this possibility but in their model, the LTC insurances are not actuary
fair.
8Pestieau and Sato (2007) consider that the children can devote part of their time or part of their income to
provide cares to their parents.




3.3 The state: public nursing homes
The government ﬁnances public nursing homes. Parents that decide to go to the public nursing
home do not receive help from insurance companies and their family. We consider that the
production technology for nursing homes is imperfect: for an investment of g, the corresponding
quality of LTC receives in a public home is γg with γ ≤ 1.
4 First best








i + Hi) = (n1 + n2)IH + (n3 + n4)IL + w. Welfare maximizing consumption and
care levels are: ∀i,
u0(Cc
i) = v0(CP
i ) = h0(Hi)
In the ﬁrst best situation, the government equates the marginal utility of consumption and
of help for all individuals. The consumption and help levels are determined by the budget
constraint.
4.1 Decentralization of the ﬁrst best
Suppose that the government can make lump-sum transfers between all individuals. In this
case, if the private insurance is fair, the ﬁrst best can be decentralized with a generalized market
ﬁnancing of LTC. With fair insurance, we have CP = H. More precisely, with an available
income of y, we have CP = H =
y
1+π. Hence, to decentralize the ﬁrst best, the available income
of the parents must be π percent higher than the available income of the children. So that, the
parents’ consumption after buying the insurance is equal to those of the children. Hence, the
government can decentralize the ﬁrst best with appropriate lump-sump transfers.
As an alternative to a generalized market ﬁnancing, the ﬁrst best can also be decentralized
with a mixed family/market mechanism. If altruistic children are appropriately compensated,
the ﬁrst best can be implemented. A necessary condition for that is perfect altruism (β = 1).
Finally note that if providing public nursing home places is frictionless (γ = 1), the ﬁrst best
can be also be decentralized by that mean.
8To summarize, the ﬁrst best can be decentralized if (1) the government can make any kind
of lump-sump transfers between individuals and (2) either the private insurance is fair or public
home provision is eﬃcient (γ = 1). If one of these conditions does not hold, the ﬁrst best cannot
be implemented.
4.2 Information constraint
In this paper, we assume that the government cannot observe the individual characteristics of the
parents (their wealth level) and of the children (their altruism). These information constraints
limit the possible actions of the government. Rich parents can always claim they are poor. The
transfers needed to decentralize the ﬁrst best are then unfeasible. Moreover, altruism being
unobservable, altruistic children will help their parents only if they have an interest to do so.
5 Second best
5.1 Government intervention in LTC ﬁnancing
Depending on the solution chosen for LTC ﬁnancing, the amount of help received by a dependent
parents is a∗, s∗ or γg. The government intervenes in the ﬁnancing of LTC but its action is
constrained by the unobservability of the individuals’ characteristic. In this paper, we consider
two diﬀerent interventions by the government: (1) a direct ﬁnancing of public nursing home,
(2) an intervention in the provision of informal LTC by the family. For that, the government
pays a subsidy σ to the children that help their parents. Remember that even if altruism is not
observable, the parent’s dependency and the provision of informal help can be observed.
To ﬁnance these policies, the government imposes a ﬂat tax t on labor income. This means
that only the children contribute to the ﬁnancing of the governmental intervention. The total
resources available for LTC ﬁnancing are thus tw. The government must keep the budget
balanced and in the remaining, we denote by µ the Lagrange multiplier of the resource constraint.
To make thing simpler, we make the assumption that poor parents do not have access to
private insurances. This assumption is not very demanding since, as we will see, rich parents
may not subscribe to a LTC insurance.
5.2 Organizing LTC ﬁnancing
There are many possible ways to ﬁnance and organize LTC in this economy. Parents of group
1 have two options to ﬁnance their LTC needs: They can go to the public nursing home or
9they can buy a LTC insurance. Parents of group 2 have a third possibility: they can beneﬁt
from child support. Parents of group 3 can either beneﬁt from child support or go to the public
nursing home. Finally, parents of group 4 have no other option than going to the public home.
This means that there are 12 diﬀerent ways of ﬁnancing LTC.
Let us denote by mM the number of parents that buy a LTC insurance, by mF, the number
of parents that receive help from their family and by mS the number of parents that go to
the public nursing home, with mM + mF + mS = 1, mF ≤ n2 + n3 and mM ≤ n1 + n2. The
government must pay a subsidy σ to mF children and ﬁnance public nursing homes for mS
parents. The budget constraint of the government writes as follow:
mFπσ + mSπg ≤ wt
The objective of the government is to maximize the welfare W deﬁned as follow:
W = (n1 + n2)v(IH) + (n3 + n4)v(IL)







+ mF[(1 − π)u(w(1 − t)) + πu(
w(1 − t) + σ
2
) + πh(
w(1 − t) + σ
2
)]
+ mS[u(w(1 − t)) + πh(γg)]
The ﬁrst term is the utility parents derived from consuming their wealth endowment. The second
term is the utility of the parents that buy a LTC insurance and the utility of their children.
Notice that parents that are insured do not consume IH but Ih
1+π i.e. their wealth endowment
minus the insurance premium. The third term is the utility of helping children and their parents
and the last term is the utility of the parents that go to the public home and their children.
The problem that the government faces is the following: it must decide on which form of LTC
ﬁnancing for each group of parents (among the 12 available) and it must decides on the tax level
t, on the subsidy level σ and on the amount of ﬁnancing for the public homes g. The government
faces two types of constraint. First, the budget must be balanced. Second, the individuals must
prefer the proposed solution to any other available solution. These second set of constraints
emerges from the fact that the government cannot observe the individual characteristics (wealth
and altruism) and therefore, the proposed LTC ﬁnancing must be incentive compatible.
5.3 The unconstrained problem
Let us ignore for a while (until next subsection) the incentive constraints. We split the govern-
ment problem into two sub-problems. First, we search for the 12 possible organizations of LTC,
10the optimal values of the t, σ and g. Second, we compare the welfare to determine the optimal
LTC organization for the economy.
To determine the optimal values of t,σ and g, we maximize the welfare W subject to the
government budget constraint. This constraint binds at the optimum. Hence, the Lagrangian
of the problem can be expressed as:
L = W + µ[mFπσ + mSπg − wt]
LEMMA 5.1 For any mM,mF,mS, the solution of the unconstrained problem is such that:
w(1 − t∗) = σ∗ = g∗
PROOF: The ﬁrst-order conditions of the maximization problem read as follow:
∂L
∂t




w(1 − t) + σ





w(1 − t) + σ






+ µ = 0 (5.3)
Solving, we have: w(1 − t∗) = − 1
µ = σ∗ = g∗.
Lemma 5.1 has two implications. First, altruistic children are perfectly compensated for
the help they give to their parents and so their consumption is not altered when they help
their parents. Second, the government spends the same amount for a dependent parent in a
nursing home than for a dependent parent who receives care from his/her family. There are
two diﬀerences with the ﬁrst best. First, the marginal utility of care is not equalized for all the
dependent parents due to the imperfect nursing home technology. Second, the parents’ marginal
utility of consumption is no longer equal because their wealth endowment is non observable.
Hence, lemma 5.1 implies that whenever γ < 1, the parents of an altruistic child are better-oﬀ
if they receive familial support than if they go to a public nursing home. Together, these imply
that parents of groups 2 and 3 have a higher utility when they receive help from their family than
when they go to the public home. Then, the number of possible organization of LTC reduces to
four. In table 1, we note the type of help received by each group of parents in the four possible
solutions.
Now, we move to the ﬁrst part of the problem to see which of these four solution gives
the highest welfare. To obtain the optimal tax and subsidy levels and the optimal spending in
nursing home, we must solve the last ﬁrst order condition (the derivative of L with respect to
11Solution 1 Solution 2
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Table 1: The 4 possible organization of LTC
µ) which, after integrating the results of lemma 5.1 gives us:
σ∗ = g∗ =
w
1 + π(1 − mM)
, t∗ =
π(1 − mM)
1 + π(1 − mM)
(5.4)
The optimal values of t,σ and g depend on the number of elderly dependent that receive a ﬁnan-
cial assistance from the state, either directly through admission in a public home or indirectly
through the compensation paid to their helping child. And, the highest the number of parents
in the state ﬁnanced system, the lowest is the public contribution per individual and the highest
the tax rate. In other words, the largest mF + mS, the highest the tax rate and the lowest σ
and g. Let us denote by t∗
i, σ∗
i and g∗
i the optimal values of t, σ and g in solution i = 1,...,4,













if n2 > n1, the ordering between solution 2 and 3 is inverted.
For each solution i, let us denote by qi = 1 + π(1 − mM). To keep the problem simpler,
we will assume that n1 = n2. Denote by Wi the welfare level when solution i is applied. The
comparison of the welfare levels gives the following:
LEMMA 5.2 Deﬁne Z12 = 1
n2π(q1 lnq1−q2 lnq2)+ 1+π
π ln(1+π) and Z24 = 1
n1π(q2 lnq2−(1+
π)ln(1 + π)) + 1+π
π ln(1 + π). We have:
1. Z12 > Z24.
2. W1 ≥ Max[W2,W3,W4] if ln IH
w ≥ Z12.
123. W2 ≥ Max[W1,W3,W4] if ln IH
w ∈ [Z24 + n1 lnγ,Z12].
4. W4 ≥ Max[W1,W2,W3] if ln IH
w ≤ Z24 + n1 lnγ.
PROOF: See Appendix.
Lemma 5.2 reads as follow: if the wealth endowment of the rich parents is high enough
compared to the labor income of the child, the welfare is maximized when the rich parents are
left out of the state-ﬁnanced LTC system and rely on private insurance schemes to ﬁnance their
LTC needs. Leaving aside the rich parents form the publicly supported cares has two advantages:
the tax rate is lower, which is beneﬁcial to all the children, and the per-capita contribution of
the state to dependent parents is higher, which obviously beneﬁts to all the parents that received
state-ﬁnanced LTC.
When the wealth endowment of the rich parents declines relative to the labor income, the
highest welfare is achieved in a generalized state-ﬁnanced LTC system.9 But this switch from
private insurance to state ﬁnanced LTC is organized in two steps. Because the public provision
of nursing homes involves resource losses, there are intermediate values of IH
w for which rich
parents behaves diﬀerently depending if their child is altruistic or not. For these intermediate
values, the rich parents of non-altruistic child will continue to ﬁnance their LTC needs with
private insurance while the rich parents of altruistic child will be helped by their family in case
of dependency. It is only when the ratio IH
w declines further that all the parents will depend on
state-ﬁnanced LTC and that the private insurance will no longer be bought (even at an actuary
fair price).10
Call ˜ Zk = eZk
, lemma 5.2 can be restates as follow: solution 1 dominates for IH
W ≥ γ ˜ Z12 and
solution 2 dominates for IH
W ∈ [γn1 ˜ Z24,γ ˜ Z12]. These conditions are represented on ﬁgure 1.
5.4 Incentive constraints
We now introduce the incentive constraints in the above problem. The government cannot
observe the wealth of the parents nor the altruism of the children. Rich parents can then
pretend that they are poor and altruistic children can pretend that they are not. Hence, the
LTC ﬁnancing must be such that each group of parents/children chooses the proposed solution
rather than another possible way to ﬁnance LTC.
9This solution is the one adopted in Germany where all the elderly dependent can beneﬁt from the universal
dependency insurance ﬁnanced by labor taxes.
10For the state, instead of solution 2, it would be optimal to smoothly increase the number of parents in the














Figure 1: LTC ﬁnancing in the unconstrained problem
Two sets of incentive constraints must be considered. First, if the organization of LTC
prescribes that rich parents (or some of them) buy an insurance they must agree to do so.
Rich parents may have incentives to mimic the behavior of the poor ones. By doing so, they
save on private insurance and therefore enjoy a higher consumption and, in case of dependency,
they do receive assistance from the state or from their family. Therefore, whenever the optimal
organization of LTC calls for market mechanism for the rich, the planer must ensure that the
rich parents indeed prefer the market solution to any other available one. This means that
their utility with the LTC insurance must be higher than the other options they have for LTC
ﬁnancing: family support and public homes for parents of group 2 and public nursing home only














) ≥ v(IH) + πh(
w(1 − t) + σ
2
) (IC2)
Second, if the proposed LTC ﬁnancing is such that altruistic children (or some of them)
should help their dependent parents, they must agree to do so rather than mimicking the behavior
14of non-altruistic children. The corresponding incentive constraint writes as follow:
U(
w(1 − t) + σ)
2
) + h(
w(1 − t) + σ)
2
) ≥ U(w(1 − t)) + h(γg) (IC3)
We ﬁrst check if and when the unconstrained solution, described in lemma 5.2, satisﬁes the
corresponding incentive constraints.




1, the constraints (IC1), (IC2) and (IC3) are satisﬁed. By lemma 5.1, we know that (IC3)
is satisﬁed for sure.
Let ¯ Z = 1+π
π ln(1 + π) − lnq1, the unconstrained solution is not incentive compatible when
ln IH
w < ¯ Z. More precisely, the constraint (IC2) is not satisﬁed for ln IH
w < ¯ Z. Moreover, (IC1)
is neither satisﬁed for ln IH
w < ¯ Z+lnγ. We can show that solution 1 is not always incentive com-
patible in the parameter space where it gives the highest welfare in the unconstrained problem.
That is:
LEMMA 5.3 There exists a parameter space where solution 1 is optimal but not incentive
compatible: ¯ Z > Z12.
PROOF: The inequality ¯ Z > Z12 can be simpliﬁed to 1 > −
q1
n2π.
So for ln IH
w ∈ [Z12, ¯ Z], the highest welfare would be achieved if rich parents are insured
but some or all of them prefer to receive LTC from their family or from the state. Clearly, the
budget will not be balanced if this happens.




2, the constraints (IC1) and (IC3) hold. Moreover, inequality (IC2) should be reversed.
Deﬁne ¯ ¯ Z = 1+π
π ln(1 + π) − lnq2, solution 2 does not satisfy (IC2) if ln IH
W < ¯ ¯ Z + lnγ. We can
show that solution 2, when it dominates the other possible solutions, is not always incentive
compatible. That is:
LEMMA 5.4 There exists a parameter space where solution 2 is optimal but not incentive
compatible: ¯ Z > ¯ ¯ Z > Z12.
PROOF: The inequalities ¯ ¯ Z > Z12 and ¯ Z > ¯ ¯ Z can be simpliﬁed to n2 > 0.
Finally solution 4 is always incentive compatible. In ﬁgure 2, we represent the parameter
space where the unconstrained solution does not satisfy the corresponding incentive constraints.
To construct the ﬁgure, let ˜ Z = e
¯ Z and ˜ ˜ Z = e
¯ ¯ Z.
Information asymmetry has for consequence that rich parents do not always subscribe to











































































































































Figure 2: Incentive constraints in the unconstrained problem
explained this rational non-purchase of private LTC insurance and his explanation ﬁts our model
very well. For a rich parent, buying an insurance means that consumption if he/she remains in
good health decreases while consumption in case of dependency does not necessarily increase.
LTC support is higher only if the insurance repayment is higher than any other form of care
available. But even if the rich parents receive more cares when they are insured, they do not
necessarily buy an insurance because they trade-oﬀ the additional care beneﬁt with the insurance
premium.
Because the three forms of care are mutually exclusive, a parent that subscribe to an in-
surance renounces to the other forms of care. Hence, even if the insurance is oﬀered at a fair
premium, the cost of the insurance could be quite high once opportunity costs are incorporated.
For parents of group 1, the opportunity cost of a LTC insurance is the level of LTC they can
receive in a public nursing home. For parents of group 2, it is the LTC received from their
child. Once opportunity costs are included, cost of insurance increases dramatically and this
discourages insurance subscription.
Even if the insurance company does not charge a load factor and oﬀers the insurance at a
fair price, there is an implicit load factor because parents renounce to other forms of help. For
a repayment of a, the parents pay πa and renounces to either γg∗ (group 1) or s∗ (group 2). So
16the total cost of an insurance is πa + γg∗ or πa + s∗. Diﬀerently, we can deﬁne a implicit load
factor, ˜ θi, for the parents of group i = 1,2 equals to:








This modiﬁed load factor is the additional cost per unit of insurance paid by the parents. As
it is clear from these formulations, the higher the help received by the parents either from the
state or from their child, the higher this implicit load factor. And obviously, a high load factor
discourage insurance taking by the parents.
High insurance costs implies that rich parents buy it only if they could expect a much higher
quality of care if they are insured. This is the case if IH is high compared to g∗ and/or s∗. In
our solution 1 we have ˜ Z > 1. This means that if IH
w = 1, the rich parents do not subscribe to a
LTC insurance. It is only when the rich parents have a wealth level suﬃciently higher than the
children that they buy an insurance. This can be seen from expressions (5.5) and (5.6): When
labor income increases, the implicit load factor of insurance increases. When the parent’s wealth
increase, they buy more insurance (if they buy an insurance), and the load factor is inversely
proportional to the insurance level.
The other source of information asymmetry does not create problem. Because altruistic
children are perfectly compensated for the help they give to their parents, they have incentives
to do so. In Jousten et al. (2005), because of distortionary taxation, altruistic children are
worse-oﬀ than non altruistic ones. Hence altruistic children have incentives to behaves like
non-altruistic ones.
Note that, even if the incentive constraint (IC3) is never binding in the above problem, it
does not mean that this constraint is irrelevant in the design of a LTC ﬁnancing scheme. We will
see that this constraint must be taken into account in the problem. More in particular, when
the government distorts the LTC ﬁnancing to constraint the rich parents (or some of them) to
subscribe to a private insurance, it must check that altruistic children continues to have the
right incentives to help their parents.
As shown on ﬁgure 2, the unconstrained solution can not be implemented for IH
w ∈ [ ˜ Z12, ˜ Z]
∪[ ˜ Z24,Min[ ˜ Z12, ˜ ˜ Z + lnγ]]. In the parameter space where the unconstrained solution is not
incentive compatible, the government has two options: it can either change t, σ and γ in order
to make the proposed LTC ﬁnancing system incentive compatible or it can switch to another
LTC ﬁnancing solution. We examine in turns these two alternatives.
175.5 The constrained problem
Suppose that the government wants to have all the rich parents insured (solution 1). For that,
they must be prevented from relying on the help of their child (constraint (IC2)) and from
applying to public homes (constraint (IC1)). The only way to do so is to reduce the state-
ﬁnancing of LTC, that is reducing the help to the altruistic children σ and the quality of public
home g. But by doing so, the state must take into account that reducing σ may have an impact
on the behavior of the altruistic children of poor parents. If they receive a lower compensation
for helping their parents they may be tempted to mimic non-altruistic children. So we must
maximize the welfare W1 subject to the budget constraint, the incentive constraints (IC1), (IC2)
and (IC3) and check which constraint is binding.
For IH
w ∈ [Z12, ¯ Z], the constraint (IC2) is binding. It results that altruistic children are less
compensated for their ﬁnancial support to their parents. But this has an impact on the other two
incentive constraints because, with reduced child support, the government makes a surplus and
this surplus is redistributed to public home ﬁnancing and tax decreases. But this exacerbates
incentive problems by making the nursing home care more attractive for both altruistic children
and rich parents. So for high values of γ, the public support to nursing homes must be decreased
too. These policy changes hurts the poor parents who receive less support from their child and
lower quality nursing home.
Suppose that the government wants to have only the rich parents of non-altruistic children
to be insured (solution 2). To prevent rich parents to apply to the public homes, the government
lowers their quality. The complete solution to these problems is described in greater details in
appendix B.
5.6 Optimal policy
We conclude our analysis by establishing the optimal LTC ﬁnancing when incentive issues are
taken into account. We establish that:
PROPOSITION 5.1 There exists ∆12(γ) and ∆24(γ) such that,
1. ∆12(γ) ∈ [Z12, ¯ Z].
2. ∆24(γ) ∈ [Z24 + n1, ¯ ¯ Z + lnγ].
3. For ln Ih
w ≥ ∆12(γ), solution 1 is optimal.
4. For ln Ih
w ∈ [∆24(γ),∆12(γ)], solution 2 is optimal.
185. For ln Ih
w ≤ ∆24(γ), solution 4 is optimal.
PROOF: See appendix C.
Proposition 5.1 reads as follow: Under asymmetric information, the government continues
to use the same policy mix than in the unconstrained problem. This means that only solutions
1,2 and 4 are considered as optimal solutions.
In those parameters space where the unconstrained solution is not incentive compatible the
government has two options: either it keeps the same solution but it distorts the instrument
to satisfy the incentive constraints or it switches to another policy. The costs of these two
alternatives must be compared.
Distortions and the associated welfare losses are particularly important for high values of γ
and low values of IH
w . Consequently, in these situations, the government will switch to another
policy mix.
Finally notice that incentive issues reduce the use of market mechanism to ﬁnance LTC
needs. For incentive reasons, the parameter spaces where rich parents are insured are reduced.
Rich parents switches from market ﬁnancing to family ﬁnancing or nursing homes for incentive
purpose. Wealth unobservability therefore reduces the use of private insurances, even if they
are oﬀered for a fair price.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the LTC ﬁnancing in a society composed of heterogeneous pairs of
parent-child. In particular, we considered rich and poor parents with altruistic and non-altruistic
children. We assumed that these individual characteristics cannot be observed and we studied
the optimal LTC ﬁnancing scheme in this context.
There are three potential care ﬁnancers: the elderly himself who can subscribe to a LTC
insurance to ﬁnance his LTC needs; the family, altruistic children may devote part of their
income to ﬁnance the LTC needs of their parents and the government who intervenes directly
to provide nursing homes spaces for those uninsured parents who do not receive help from their
family, and indirectly to support altruistic children.
The main problem we identiﬁed is the rational non-purchase of private insurance by the
rich parents (Pauly, 1990). We showed how non-purchase of LTC insurance might be rational
because potential family care and/or public subsidies for poor create opportunity cost that may
cause person to reject even actuarially fair LTC insurance. Hence, private insurances have a
19high opportunity cost and consequently, private LTC insurances are crowded-out by family and
government ﬁnanced LTC. This leads to ineﬃcient provision of care
Because of unobservable income, the government cannot constraint the parents to buy an
insurance. Neither can it exclude them from family or government ﬁnanced care. Hence, the
government remains with two options: either, it diminishes the opportunity cost of private
insurances by making the other forms of care less attractive or it renounces to market ﬁnanced
LTC. Both solutions have a negative impact on the LTC received by the poor parents. Rich
parents who have multiple options for LTC ﬁnancing, including the private insurance option,
exert a negative externality on those who have less options.
In this model, we considered selﬁsh parents that only care about their consumption and
LTC levels. Altruism of parents toward children may be a reason to buy LTC insurance or to
save to ﬁnance LTC. Parents that do not wish to be burden to children may self-ﬁnance their
LTC needs. However, generous public support for altruistic children may still crowd out private
insurances even if parents are altruistic though the eﬀect could be of smaller amplitude.
Means-testing could, at least partially, overcome the information problem between the gov-
ernment and the parents. By making ﬁnancial support conditional on resources, the government
reduces the number of available options for rich parents and thereby reduces the opportunity
cost of insurances. Means-testing is extensively used in the US and in the UK. In the US, par-
ticipation in the Medicaid program is conditioned on resources. In the UK, all the individuals
must contribute to their LTC ﬁnancing in proportion of their own resources. In both cases,
assets are included in the total resources. However, despite means-testing, the crowding-out
of private insurances remains important (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007). By contrast, in Ger-
many, with the introduction of an almost universal public insurance, public ﬁnancing of LTC
is not conditioned on income. With this solution, individually ﬁnanced cares only complement
the state ﬁnancing and an individual who buys additional LTC provision does not renounce to
his/her rights to publicly ﬁnanced cares. The drawback is that the government ﬁnances (at
least part of) the LTC needs of people that are wealthy enough to ﬁnance these needs with their
own resources. Consequently, for a given budget (or tax rate), the individual’s claim to LTC
ﬁnancing is smaller. And, as we have shown, the individual’s beneﬁt is smaller also for a higher
tax rate.
In this paper, we considered that the three forms of care are mutually exclusive. Few
evidences are available on the mix between the three forms of care both at the individual and
the aggregate levels. Considering mixed LTC ﬁnancing of LTC does not eliminate the high
opportunity cost of insurances. If the government is the payer of last resort, like in the Medicaid
20program, private insurances continue to have a high opportunity cost and crowding-out of private
insurance remains important (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007) . If the private insurances ﬁnance
additional cares, parents only complement state ﬁnanced cares with private insurances. In such
a system, most of the dependent parents receive state ﬁnanced cares. Hence, the government
must then ﬁnance an almost universal service for the dependent parents and the ﬁnancial burden
of such a policy can be considerable.
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22A Proof of proposition 5.2
Under the hypothesis that n1 = n2, we have W2 − W3 = −n1 lnγ ≥ 0 and solution 3 is always
weakly dominated by solution 2.
Solution 1 dominates if W1 ≥ W2 and W1 ≥ W4. Rewriting these two conditions, we have:




W1 − W4 ≥ 0 ⇔ ln
IH
w
≥ Z14 + n1 lnγ, (A.8)
where Z14 = 1
(n1+n2)π(q1 lnq1 − (1 − n1 − n2)(1 + π)ln(1 + π)). We can show that Z12 > Z14.
This inequality is true if
n1q1 lnq1 + n2(1 + π)ln(1 + π) > (n1 + n2)q2 lnq2 (A.9)
Taking n1 = n2 and deﬁning f(x) = (1 + π(1 − x))ln(1 + π(1 − x)), (A.9) is equivalent to:
f(2n1) + f(0) > 2f(n1)
Since f(x) is a convex function, this inequality holds true and Z12 > Z14.
Solution 2 dominates if ln IH
w ≤ Z12 and W2 ≥ W4. This condition can be expressed as:
W2 − W4 ≥ 0 ⇔ ln
IH
w
≥ Z24 + n1 lnγ, (A.10)
where Z24 = 1
n1π(q2 lnq2−(1+π)ln(1+π))+ 1+π
π ln(1+π). Taking n1 = n2, Z12 > Z24 if (A.9)
holds.
B Constrained solution
Constrained solution 1 The objective of the government is to maximize L with mM = n1+n2
and mF = n3 subject to the incentive compatible constraints. Denote by the λi, the Lagrange
multiplier of constraint (ICi), i = 1,2,3.
The solution to this problem reads as follow:
˜ t1 =
λ3 + (1 − n3π)π(1 − n1 − n2 − λ1 − λ2)
(1 − n3π)(1 + π(1 − n1 − n2 − λ1 − λ2))
(B.11)
˜ σ1 =
w(λ3(2 − n3π) − π(λ2 − n3)(1 − n3π))
n3π(1 − n3π)(1 + π(1 − n1 − n2 − λ1 − λ2))
(B.12)
˜ g1 =
w(π(n4 − λ1) − λ3)
n4π(1 + π(1 − n1 − n2 − λ1 − λ2))
(B.13)
23We must now check which of the incentive constraint is binding.
Given lemma 5.3, for all ln IH
w < ¯ Z, λ2 is positive. This implies that, in order to prevent
rich parents of an altruistic child to rely on family support, the government reduces its subsidy
to caregiving children: ∂˜ σ1
∂λ2 < 0. Reducing support to altruist children save resources for the
government who reduces the tax rate ∂˜ t1
∂λ2 > 0 and increases the nursing home care spending
∂˜ g1
∂λ2 > 0. Note that these distortions are inversely related to the ratio Ih
w : ∂λ2
∂IH/w ≤ 0.
A positive λ2 makes then parents in nursing homes better-oﬀ. Clearly this is only feasible if
parents of group 1 prefer to be insured and if children of group 3 continue to provide support








)2 ≥ γ (B.15)
Because λ2 is a function of IH
w , these two conditions deﬁne the parameter spaces where the
incentive constraints (IC1) and (IC3) are slack in the constrained problem. When one of these
constraints is binding, the corresponding Lagrange multiplier must be positive. When it is the
case, the nursing home quality is reduced.
Constrained solution 2 In solution 2, constraint (IC2) is irrelevant and only (IC1) must be
considered. The constraint is binding for ln Ih




π(1 − n1 − λ1)








n4(1 + π(1 − n1 − λ1))
.
The quality of nursing home is reduced to prevent rich parents of group 1 to apply. This relaxes
the resource constraint and the government increases its subsidy to helping children and reduces
the tax rate.
C Proof of proposition 5.1
By lemma 5.1, we need only to consider solutions 1, 2 and 4 among the 12 available.
• ln IH
w = Z12 is the locus of IH
w and γ such that the welfare with the unconstrained solution
1 (W1) is equal to the welfare with the unconstrained solution 2 (W1) (lemma 5.2).
• ˜ W1 ≤ W1 for all parameters such that ln IH
w ≤ ¯ Z and ˜ W1 = W1 > W2 for ln IH
w = ¯ Z
(lemma 5.3).
24• ∂ ˜ W1
∂IH/w > 0 since ∂ ˜ W1
∂λ1 < 0, ∂ ˜ W1
∂λ2 < 0, ∂ ˜ W1
∂λ3 < 0 and ∂λ1
∂IH/w < 0, ∂λ2
∂IH/w < 0, ∂λ3
∂IH/w < 0.
Combining these three facts, there exists a locus ln IH
w = ∆12(γ) such that, on the locus ˜ W1 = W2
and Z12 < ∆12(γ) < ¯ Z.
• ln IH
w = Z24 + lnγ is the locus of IH
w and γ such that the welfare with the unconstrained
solution 2 (W2) is equal to the welfare with the unconstrained solution 4 (W4) (lemma
5.2).
• ˜ W2 ≤ W2 for all parameters such that ln IH
w ≤ ¯ ¯ Z + lnγ and ˜ W2 = W2 > W4 for ln IH
w =
¯ ¯ Z + lnγ (lemma 5.4).




Combining these three facts, there exists a locus ln IH
w = ∆24(γ) such that, on the locus ˜ W2 = W4
and Z24 + lnγ < ∆24(γ) < ¯ ¯ Z + lnγ.
25